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A Primer on Information Markets  
 
1.  Introduction 
In 1988, the US Commodity Futures Trading Commission gave permission for the 
University of Iowa to begin operating the Iowa Electronic Market (IEM), thus 
ushering in the world's first information market (sometimes called a prediction 
market).  Similar markets have subsequently appeared at the University of British 
Columbia and Vienna University of Technology.  Outside the education sector, firms 
such as Trade Exchange Network (tradesports.com) and a joint venture between 
Goldman Sachs and Deutsche Bank (economicderivatives.com) have set up public 
information markets, while other firms such as Hewlett-Packard, Lilly, and Siemens 
have used information markets for internal purposes.1 
Information markets are similar to standard derivatives markets in that they 
provide a mechanism for trading financial claims to future contingencies.  However, 
they differ in that, first, they are more accessible to small investors, and, second, they 
offer markets on a wider range of events, including politics, sports, legal, weather, 
business, and entertainment.2 
The increasing popularity of information markets reflects several factors.  The 
university-based markets were initially designed to serve primarily as teaching and 
research tools by providing students and staff with the opportunity to study a trading 
environment that is more realistic than the typical laboratory setting, but without the 
scale, complexity and noise of real-world markets.  More recently, based on the 
proven ability of markets to gather and assimilate dispersed information, the potential 
forecasting power of information markets has generated most interest. 
In this paper, we describe the structure of some existing information markets, 
outline their key features, explain what they can be used for, and assess their 
predictive ability.3  Finally, we consider the possible advantages of setting up of an 
information market in New Zealand. 
                                                
1 For forecasting printer sales (Hewlett-Packard), which drug would be successful (Lilly) and whether 
or not a software project would deliver on time (Siemens).  
2 Examples include: the 2004 best actor Oscar, moviebox office receipts, the 2000 US presidential 
election, the 2004 Super Bowl, and the outcome of the 2005 Michael Jackson trial. 
3 Our objective is only to provide an introductory summary.  Readers interested in obtaining more 
details about the operation, success, and possible usages of information markets should consult Wolfer 
and Zitzewitz (2004) and Hahn (2004). 
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2.  Trading in information markets  
The most common contract traded on information markets is one that yields a 
fixed payoff if and only if a certain event occurs.  For example, suppose there is a 
market on who the New Zealand prime minister will be on 31 October 2005.  Three 
contracts are on offer: Helen Clarke, Don Brash, and Other, each of which pays $1 if 
the corresponding individual becomes prime minister and zero otherwise.  In this 
case, the price of each contract represents the market's estimate of the probability of 
each being prime minister on 31/10/05.4  For example, if the Clarke contract is trading 
at $0.51, then the market believes she has a 51% chance of winning the election. 
Contracts that offer a variable payout provide different information. For 
example, suppose there is a contract that pays $0.01 for every percentage point of 
Parliament seats won by the National Party in the 2005 election, i.e., $0.20 if they win 
20% of the seats, $0.50 if they win 50%, and so on.  In this case, the contract price 
reveals the outcome expected by the market.  That is, if the price is $0.55, then the 
market expects National to win 55% of the seats.    
Contracts can even be used to discover an entire probability distribution. For 
example, the price of a contact that pays $1 if the Green Party wins at least 10 seats in 
parliament tells us the market’s estimate of the probability of that party winning at 
least 10 seats.  A similar contract with a threshold of at least 20 seats reveals the 
market’s estimate of the probability of the party winning at least 20 seats.  By offering 
many such contacts we can learn the market’s beliefs about the entire distribution. 
 
3.  Information markets around the world: two examples 
(i)  The IEM 
The IEM is operated by faculty at the University of Iowa’s Henry B. Tippie 
College of Business on a non-profit basis. Trading is conducted via the IEM’s 
website, http://www.biz.uiowa.edu/iem/ and the maximum trading position allowed is 
$500.  Participants must deposit account funds by cheque and are charged a $5 
                                                
4  Strictly speaking, this is only approximately true unless both the riskless interest rate and the contract 
risk premium are exactly zero.  However, both these conditions are more-or-less satisfied for most 
information market contracts, so the level of approximation is likely to be very small.  
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administration fee.  Both fixed and variable payoff contracts are offered.  No short 
selling is allowed. 
 The focus of the IEM is on political and economic events such as national 
elections and stock prices of leading US companies.  Most of these markets are open 
to public participation, but some are restricted to specific courses or universities 
affiliated with the University of Iowa. 
 
(ii)  TradeSports 
TradeSports is an Irish-based commercial entity that offers trading via its 
website www.tradesports.com. Unlike the IEM, TradeSports places no restriction on 
the value of a trader’s position, requiring only that clients have sufficient cash in their 
TradeSports account, and allows short selling.  Margin trading operates - short-term 
contracts require “worst case scenario” margin to be posted, but longer term contracts 
have much lower initial requirements, with margin calls then made as required.   
A much wider range of contracts are offered by TradeSports than IEM, on 
events related to economics, entertainment, politics, and weather.  For example, it 
currently offers contracts on whether Osama Bin Laden will be captured by certain 
dates.  It also recently offered a contract on whether Yasser Arafat would cease 
residing in Palestine, which expired when Arafat died as at that point he no longer 
lived there.   
 
4.  What do information markets offer? 
(i)  Teaching Tool 
Many university teachers around the world have used the IEM for the purpose of 
helping students to learn about the mechanisms and complexities of financial markets, 
and to provide hands-on insight into aspects of finance theory.  For example, pure 
securities and state prices are integral, but abstract, parts of modern asset pricing 
theory that are made concrete by the fixed-price contracts described in section 2.   
The diverse events on which the contracts are written mean the usefulness of 
information markets as a pedagogical device is not simply limited to finance, but is 
also extremely relevant for courses in accounting, macroeconomics, microeconomics, 
and political science.  This encourages students to think about interrelationships 
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between different subjects, thereby fostering an interdisciplinary approach that is 
helpful in understanding traditional financial markets.  
 
(i)  Research Resource 
Information markets allow researchers access to data that is less artificial than 
those generated by laboratory markets, but in more manageable quantities than is 
available from traditional markets; in the case of the IEM, they also provide a wider 
range of trader-specific information.  These desirable features have prompted studies 
of individual trader behaviour, psychological biases, and price dynamics.5   
Most studies, however, have focused on the predictive power of information 
markets, particularly in comparison with more traditional approaches like opinion 
polls and expert analysis. Overall, these suggest that information markets provide 
predictions of future events that are least as accurate as the more traditional methods. 
For example, Berg et al. (2003) examine the accuracy of prices in the IEM 
political markets and find that the market outperformed polls in 9 out of 15 national 
elections. Across all elections, the average poll error was 1.91% while the average 
market error was 1.49%. Thus relative to polls, information markets seem to be 
superior at predicting election results. 
Similarly, Forsythe et al. (1992) discuss the results of the 1988 US presidential 
election, the first event on which the IEM offered a market. Even with a relatively 
small number of traders (192) in a non-traditional field, the market predictions proved 
superior to 6 polls taken around election time. This suggests that the well-known 
advantages of markets can eventuate even when traders know little about the 
environment or other traders. 
Wolfer and Zitzewitz (2004) consider the accuracy of prediction markets 
across a wider range of events, and conclude that these markets generally perform 
better than opinion polls and do at least as well as expert opinions and other standard 
barometers.  They also find that, despite the presence of some behavioural biases, 
information markets have thus far offered little in the way of arbitrage opportunities 
and been largely immune to manipulation.  
 
(iii) Policy Instrument 
                                                
5 A list of some the research undertaken using information market data appears at the end of this paper. 
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The success of information markets in predicting future outcomes has 
focussed attention on their potential value as a policy tool.  Private sector firms have 
already begun to utilise these opportunities via the establishment of internal 
information markets.  For example, Siemens recently found that such a market 
predicted it would be unable to complete a software project by a particular date, while 
standard processes suggested the opposite.  In this case, the market prediction turned 
out to be the correct one. At Hewlett-Packard, an internal information market proved 
to be a better forecaster of future sales than more traditional methods.  More such 
applications seem likely in the future - information markets could play a significant 
role in gauging customer interest, determining organisational challenges, forecasting 
earnings, and exploiting potential markets.     
In the government sector, Hahn (2004) points out that the prices provided by 
information markets could be used to inform public policy across a range of issues, 
particularly in aiding assessment of initiatives that have high costs and uncertain 
benefits.  For example, the potential uptake of a subsidised vaccination programme 
could be estimated using an information market.  An innovative, and ultimately 
controversial, use of information markets for public policy purposes surfaced in 2003 
when the US Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency suggested the creation of 
a market specialising in various geopolitical contracts, with the aim of predicting the 
likelihood of a terrorist attack.  However, the potential for terrorists to profit from 
such a market raised a furore and the proposal was dropped.      
 
5.  Conclusion: The case for a NZ information market 
For the reasons cited above - teaching tool, research resource, policy 
instrument - an information market focusing on NZ events has obvious benefits.  
Students would have the opportunity to obtain first-hand experience with market 
operations, thereby facilitating their movement into the industry; NZ researchers 
would have ready access to data that would enable them to contribute to the body of 
knowledge in a topical and growing area of research; policy-makers would obtain the 
advantages of market-based predictions about uncertain future events. The 
establishment of a public information market in New Zealand could also raise 
awareness of the potential benefits of such markets in the New Zealand business 
community, which in turn may lead to the increased use of internal markets in New 
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Zealand organizations, a development that has the potential for improved decision 
making and increased productivity. 
 Of course, some of these benefits could be obtained by contracting the IEM to 
run NZ-event markets.  However, the IEM requirement for account deposits to be 
made in the form of USD cheques is likely to significantly deter NZ participation, and 
hence the level of informed information incorporated in prices.  Moreover, the range 
of possible events would be more constrained than in a NZ-based market.  To achieve 
the full benefits of an information market, a NZ-based organisation seems essential.  
However, establishing and running such a market is costly, requiring the creation and 
ongoing maintenance of a new trading platform, while having only limited capacity to 
recoup many of these costs from participants in a small market.  Corporate, 
educational and government support is likely to be essential.  
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